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Paris, Peace conference, 1919, Bulgaria

MEMORANDUM

Addressed to the Peace Conference

BY

J. E. GUESHOFF
Former Bulgarian Prime Minister

AND

D. TSOKOFF
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MEMORANDUM

We have just learned through the press of the Greek memorandum presented to the Peace Conference by Mr. Venizelos. Being charged by the Bulgarian Government to go to Paris in order to defend before the Peace Congress the rights and interests of the Bulgarian people, we take the liberty of transmitting to you both the refutations called for by that memorandum, and the reflexions which are suggested by it.

To begin with, Mr. Venizelos lays claim to Bulgarian Thrace in which, according to his own estimation, there live 88,000 Greeks, while the whole Province, prior to the Balkan wars, counted 296,926 Bulgarians distributed as follows:

Exarchists	176,554
Uniates	1,700
Patriarchists	23,170
Pomaks (Bulgarian Mussulmans)	95,502

If in 1912 the Bulgarians had agreed that seven Greek candidates and only one Bulgarian should be presented at the elections in Thrace, it was because, on one side, the six delegates were alloted to Thrace which comprised Constantinople and the Dardanelles, as also because the Pomaks were counted as Turks, and on the other, in virtue of the same electoral compromise the Greeks had agreed that in Macedonia there should stand for election seven Bulgarian candidates against one Greek (in reality four Greek candidates, of whom three for the Chalcidic Peninsula, the caza of Grebena of the Sandjak of Monastir, territories never claimed by us).

Mr. Venizelos intentionally omits to state the fact that 370,000 Bulgarians live in that part of Macedonia handed over to Greece by the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913. According to the principle invoked by Mr. Venizelos, it is not therefore Thrace which should be given to Greece but the Bulgarians should be made the possessors of the vast territories now held by the Greeks. The insistence with which Mr. Venizelos claims Bulgarian Thrace completely shatters the charges of imperialism he hurls against the Bulgarians. The latter have never desired anything which is not ethnically their own, and they have never claimed anything which the Great Powers, as well as their neighbours, have not recognised as Bulgarian.

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In fact, there exist many international acts which attest the Bulgarian character of the territories always claimed by Bulgaria in virtue of the nationality principle. In its February issue *The Contemporary Review* enumerates the most important of these international documents.

Serbia by its treaty of alliance with Bulgaria, signed March 4, 1912, solemnly recognised to Bulgaria "the right to the territories east of the Rhodopes and the river Strouma," and "pledged itself not to formulate any claims in regard to Macedonia, including the territory along Albania which was called the "contested zone"; that zone according to the declarations of the late Mr. Milovanovitch, one of the signers of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, was to be ceded to Bulgaria in case Serbia obtained Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As to Greece, during the Balkan war she not only consented to Bulgaria's possession of the whole of Thrace as far as Midia-Enos, but on April 23, 1913, through Mr. Ghennadius, her delegate to the Conference of London, she demanded for a frontier "the line from the lakes lying at the base of the Chalcidic Peninsula with a background from Salonica sufficient to protect that city from the reach of the Bulgarian cannons" (*Les Bulgares devant le Congrès de la Paix,* p. 194-195).

Do similar documents corroborate the pretensions of the Greeks? Has Europe ever admitted as ethnically Greek all the territories claimed as such by Mr. Venizelos? Have serious scholars conversant with the Near-Eastern questions recognised as legitimate the territorial claims forwarded by the Greeks?

Far from it. On the contrary, the names of the writers expert on the subject who declare the Greek claims as greatly exaggerated, is legion. We will here cite the opinion of Chéradame, an outspoken philhellenist, who in his book, *Le plan pangermaniste démasqué* (p. 232) makes the following statement: "The Greeks in Turkey—so the map tells us—form small patches in the Ottoman territory, without ever forming an agglomeration sufficiently compact to claim the incontestable right to a certain part of the Ottoman Empire."

In claiming to-day "a well-defined part," and that of the Balkan Peninsula and of Asia Minor, to which part, according to Chéradame, the Greeks do not possess "an incontestable right," is not Mr. Venizelos subject to imperialistic tendencies he so readily attributes to the Bulgarians? The Bulgarians have never been imperialists. Contrary to repeated assertions coming from interested quarters, they never aimed at obtaining a hegemony in the Balkans. Their

claims have never gone beyond their ethnical confines. Their conciliatory spirit will always render them willing to subscribe to a cession of certain territory demanded by the economic interests of their neighbours, should they themselves, moved by a similar spirit, manifest a readiness to cede to Bulgaria other territories indispensable to its economic development.

"The democratic conception of the Allied Nations," says Mr. Venizelos, "could not admit of other nationality criterium except the national conscience." And he cites the case of Coritza which town in his opinion should revert to Greece, for the simple reason that before the Balkan wars it counted 2250 Greek scholars to only 200 Albanian. Let us apply that criterium to Macedonia: Before the Balkan wars there were in it 63,869 Bulgarian scholars against 39,910 Greek (half of whom were Bulgarian and the other half in districts which we have never claimed), and 3305 Serbian (Vladimir Sis: *Mazedonien,* p. 90).

Mr. Venizelos admits that in 1904 there were in Macedonia 757,-532 Exarchists (Bulgarianised Slavs). It is an established fact that the total number of the Bulgarians in that Province is about 1,172,136, which is 81½% of the entire Christian population (*The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe,* by Leon Dominian, published by the American Geographical Society, New York, 1917). Should one care to consult the testimony of European authorities on the ethnical character of Macedonia, he may be referred to the documental evidences found in *la Grande Encyclopédie francaise,* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica.*

"If Bulgaria retains the Aegean littoral, she could utilise Porto-Lagos as a base for submarines which would allow her to tip in her favour the equilibrium of forces between her and Greece."

"The equilibrium of forces?"—This is a principle which not only does not at all figure in President Wilson's programme of Jan. 8, 1918, but is expressly condemned by the Entente's statesmen. And when one takes into consideration that Greece, Serbia, and Roumania are about to double and treble their size and population, while Bulgaria, should she realise in full her national aspiration, will receive proportionally a very moderate extension of her frontiers, it is easy to see how untenable and contradictory is this argument advanced by Mr. Venizelos.

Mr. Venizelos who makes use of certain articles from the programme of President Wilson omits to cite the one which bears directly on the solution of the Balkan problem, namely: "The relations of the

Balkan States to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.''

Mr. Venizelos also fails to mention the last article of President Wilson's programme which provides for the creation of a League of Nations, ''for the purpose of affording to great and small states alike mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity.''

In view of these international guarantees Greece has nothing to fear from Bulgaria, not any more than Italy has grounds to fear the Yougoslavia because of the ports which might be ceded to it. And if a single Bulgarian port will be dangerous for the Aegean borderers, how much more so would be the numerous Greek coast towns on the Aegean and the Adriatic seas? Would that be a sufficient ground for taking them away from Greece?

Mr. Venizelos himself was of a different opinion in 1912, 1913 and 1915 when he offered both Thrace and Eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria, and when on answering an interpellation in the Greek Chamber he said: ''If we are to extend our frontier in a continuous line in order to englobe all the Greek population in Thrace, Greece so distended along the sea and possessing no backbone will become more feeble than if her frontiers were rounded up in another sense.'' (*Carnegie Balkan Report,* p. 186.)

In order to conciliate his many ''variations,'' on the subject of territorial concessions which he has made to Bulgaria, Mr. Venizelos now asserts that Bulgaria does not merit any, simply because of her alliance with the Central Powers. Before envisaging this allegation we may be permitted to examine the other complaints made against our nation by Mr. Venizelos.

He reproaches Bulgaria for having in 1913 desired to ''treat the territorial questions separately with each of its allies.'' Mr. Venizelos forgets that the treaties which bound Bulgaria to Serbia and Greece imposed this mode of action. Bulgaria, the mainspring of the Balkan Alliance, served as a connecting link between her allies who had signed no treaties between each other, but all of them were separately treaty-bound with Bulgaria. In fact, while Serbia in its treaty with Bulgaria had recognised the Bulgarian character of the whole of Macedonia, in the Greco-Bulgarian agreement there was made no mention of any ethnic delimitation.

Mr. Venizelos again upbraids Bulgaria for her brusque attack on

June 16/29, 1913, though the circumstances are not unknown to him that, indeed, on that date General Savoff did order certain local attacks against Serbian and Greek detachments, his action, however, was at once condemned by the Bulgarian Government which immediately dismissed him and ordered the hostilities to be stopped on Bulgarian side. Simultaneously Mr. Sasonoff was telegraphically asked to intervene at Belgrade and Athens that the military operations be suspended. To the demand of Mr. Sasonoff the Greek and Serbian governments answered by declaring war on Bulgaria. But the treaty concluded on May 19, that is, a month before the fatal attack, doesn't it throw sufficient light on those events? Greece and Serbia had pledged each other (Art. 2) "not to engage in any separate understanding with Bulgaria, to be ready to offer each other an effective aid, and to always march in accord and mutually support their territorial claims." .... Further on (Art. 4) the Greco-Serbian pact stipulated that "the frontier lines shall be established on the principle of actual occupation and the equilibrium of the three states"—two principles which not only did not figure in their respective treaties with Bulgaria, but did not at all tally with their declarations and obligations to submit their disputes to arbitration.

The Entente has always explicitly declared that it is fighting for the right of the peoples. President Wilson said in his discourse on Sept. 27 last, that impartial justice should be meted out to both the victors and vanquished. Mr. Venizelos in speaking of the Bulgarians calls them enemies. Should the Bulgarians be considered as such?

Technically, yes. But then the Austro-Hungarian Slavs who for more than thirty years had borne an alliance with Germany, and who in this war fought in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army, were also technically enemies and all we ask is, that we should be treated as they are treated.

In order that he may throw upon the entire Bulgarian people the responsibility of Bulgaria's entry in the war, Mr. Venizelos points out to the solidarity of the opposition with the Radoslavoff Cabinet. He maintains that the leaders of the Bulgarian opposition in unison with Radoslavoff demanded, prior to Bulgaria's participation in the war .... "besides the whole of Serbian Macedonia, a large part of the Kingdom of Serbia before the Balkan wars, a large part of Albania, in order to become a power bordering on the Adriatic ...., the whole of Dobroudja including Old Dobroudja ceded to Roumania in 1878."

We deny most categorically the veracity of those assertions of

Mr. Venizelos and challenge any one who might think he can refute our statements. What the Bulgarian opposition tried to do was to thwart the policy of the Radoslavoff Government. The book of Mr. Marcel Dunan, correspondent of the *"Temps"* (*L'Eté bulgare,* Paris, 1916), touches upon this point in a very simple and unambiguous manner. It is a diary of an impartial spectator eager to see and hear everything, to survey all things on the spot and narrate in the smallest minuteness the events which crowded themselves up prior to Bulgaria's plunging into the world conflict.

The "impartial justice" of President Wilson, "and the justice which" "n'a point de favoris" of President Poincaré, Mr. Venizelos would replace with "strict justice" towards the enemy. According to what code of law can Mr. Venizelos exonerate his own people from all responsibility in the policy pursued by King Constantine up to 1915 but hold the Bulgarian people responsible for the policy of Tsar Ferdinand?

"The Powers know that I have neglected nothing in my efforts to make Greece identify its fate with theirs in this world conflict." These words of Mr. Venizelos may equally be applied to the Bulgarian Opposition leaders who represented the great majority of the people. It was they who up to 1915 did all they could to prevent Bulgaria from going with Germany. If Bulgaria's geographical situation were like that of Greece, she would have acted as Greece did in her relations with the Entente Powers. Is it just, therefore, to punish her because of her geographical position? Such being the case, was the Bulgarian Opposition facilitated in its action? Did any one respond to its requests? While Greece was frequently vivsited by *missi dominici* of the Entente, Mr. Delcassé refused to grant passports to the French delegates, Longuet and Outrey, who were designated by the Committee of Foreign Affairs to come to Sofia (see *Le Pays* du 15 X 1918). The Bulgarian Opposition asked for a debarkation of Entente troops at Salonica (*L'Eté bulgare,* p. 350), believing that such a military measure would greatly strengthen its protestations. If the landing had taken place in time Bulgaria would never have been dragged on the side of the Central Powers. Is it fair to treat now Bulgaria differently from Greece, especially when one recalls that it was Mr. Venizelos himself who protested against the landing of the Entente forces at Salonica? (see *The Growth of Anti-Venizelism,* in *New Europe* of Dec. 21, 1915).

At the moment while we are writing the present memorandum, we read in the press extracts from the report on the Serbian claims

presented to the Peace Conference by Mr. Pashitch. The first delegate of a country which the Entente saved from ruin and helped to triple its population, Mr. Pashitch makes a vivid contrast with the exemplary modesty and moderation manifested by no other than the representatives of martyred Belgium. Mr. Pashitch pretends not to remember that the late Mr. Milovanovitch ceded Macedonia to Bulgaria, and trampling upon all the principles of President Wilson which he, however, never fails to invoke whenever Serbia's claims come in conflict with those of Italy and Greece, he now tries to lay hands on territories belonging to Bulgaria since her emancipation. This flagrant discord between the principles resorted to by the Serbian delegation and the reclamations forwarded by it is apparent to all.

It was to Count Andrassy that Serbia owes the possession of the Pirot district; it was due to her treaty with Austria concluded in 1880 that her attention was turned to Macedonia, a land until then recognised as Bulgarian by the Serbians themselves (see *the Carnegie Balkan Commission,* p. 7). It is to Emperor William of Germany that Greece is indebted for the acquisition of the districts of Drama, Serres, and Cavalla.

Thus favoured by the Central Empires, the Serbs and Greeks seem to forget that the principles which are taken as a basis for the establishment of a future treaty of peace have nothing in common with those of the Central Powers. Not contented with the fact that they to-day are holding in their hands territories inhabited by more than a million of Bulgarians, they now go so far as to demand parts of Bulgaria proper itself, which they have never done even during their alliance with the Germanic Empires. We would have never imagined that the Serbs and Greeks would go so far as to run counter to the great principles of the Entente.

The Bulgarian people would be very naive to expect from Greeks and Serbs any acknowledgment for the great sacrifices which it made in the struggle of 1912, but elementary justice requires that they at least should not reject it in such a hard manner, simply because of the mistakes of its government.

"Greece and Serbia on the occasion had the good fortune to make the least sacrifices and efforts and to gain the greatest advantages. Both of them almost doubled their territories and population. They greatly profited by the victories won by Bulgaria at a very high price and with an enormous and cruel loss of life." The Serbians and Greeks can ill-afford to disregard this appreciation uttered by the late Francis de Pressensé on the Balkan wars. Let them leave to others

to evoke the spectcre of Bulgaria's alleged aspirations for the hegemony of the Balkans.

The Paris Conference cannot produce any thing viable and durable unless it avoids the mistakes committed at Berlin in 1878. Such blunders excusable for that period will be unjustifiable after a bitter experience of forty years, and after the categorical declarations of the Entente, that it is combating for the rights of the small states. Mr. Llyod George himself has enumerated the small nations in his Cardiff speech of Oct. 27, 1916, more than a year after Bulgaria's entry into the war. "The great Powers," said he, "have never quite realised the value of Belgium, of Serbia, of Montenegro, of Bulgaria, of Greece, of Roumania." And in order that the Conference's work of justice which the world is impatiently waiting be accomplished in the spirit of perfect impartiality and exactitude, we once more beg of the Congress to allow that Bulgaria's case be heard before the decision of its fate be pronounced, before its future boundary lines settled.

We are perfectly confident that those who, as has said President Poincaré, to-day are "opening the gates of gaols," and are "breaking the chains" of the oppressed, would never consent to become instrumental in forging new ones, because it might offend their small allies in seeing applied the great principles for which the Entente is fighting the good fight.

SECOND MEMORANDUM

Charged by the Bulgarian Government with the semi-official mission of defending the interests of the Bulgarian people before the Peace Conference, we consider it our duty, after our answer to the Greek claims to Bulgarian lands, to reply to the territorial pretentions forwarded by the Serbian Delegation.

Serbia forgets Art. 11 of President Wilson's programme which not only denies her the right to lay claims to any portion of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, but on the contrary makes it imperative upon Serbia to give back to Bulgaria all the territories she has usurped from her in the past, which not only all impartial and thorough ethnographers, but the Serbians themselves, have recognised as incontestably Bulgarian. Serbia forgets that in virtue of the Treaty of March 13, 1912, she has admitted Macedonia as Bulgarian, in which, according to Leon Dominian (*The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe,* published by the American Geographical Society of New York, 1917, p. 205), the most recent authority on the subject, 81.2% of the Christian population are Bulgarians. Serbia also forgets that it was Austria who in order to turn off her attention from Bosnia and Herzegovina inculcated a Macedonian policy in her (The Carnegie Report, p. 7), and that at the moment she acquired those two provinces she was to give Macedonia back to Bulgaria.

Laying aside all these facts, Serbia to-day seeks to gain more Bulgarian territory, and in so doing, she is resorting to "historical and ethnographical" facts, the inconsistencies of which are so conspicuous, that one is at a loss to understand how she could imagine she could rely on them in pleading her cause before the Peace Tribunal.

Let us examine one by one these "historical and ethnographical facts."

I. "The Bulgarians," declare the Serbians in their Report, "down to 862 had not made their appearance south of the Balkans .... they had at various times invaded Thrace and Macedonia, but lost them as soon again."—

The following data will help to show how wrong and unfounded

are the Serbian assertions as to the "rapid retreats" of the Bulgarians.

a) Already in 716, in virtue of the Treaty concluded between Bulgaria and Byzantium the first was in possession of Northern Thrace, and hence of the southern part of the Balkans.

b) Sofia and upper Struma south of the Balkans were under Bulgarian rule from 809 until 1018.

c) According to the Treaty concluded in 814-815 between Bulgarian and Byzantine Empire the whole Northern Thrace from the Black Sea to the Rilo Mountains was included within the Bulgarian frontiers.

d) Belgrade, the present capital of Serbia, was in the hands of the Bulgarians from 829 clear to the beginning of the eleventh century.

e) Northern and Central Macedonia were ruled by the Bulgarians from 838 to 1018.

II. "The Turks conquered Bulgaria in 1396. Since that date up to 1878, the Bulgarians remained inactive and submissive under the yoke of the Turks."

This is a pure Serbian legend and invention. It is far from the truth that the Bulgarians contrary to the Serbians, who assert to have bowed no head to the Turks, are slaves by temperaments, listless and resigned, and have patiently endured five centuries-long bondage. Among the peoples conquered by the Turks none of them has risen in revolt as often as the Bulgarian race.

Here are the most important Bulgarian insurrections recorded in history:

1. The Pirot insurrection in 1405, under the leadership of Constantine, son of Strashimir, the King of Viddin.
2. The great Bulgarian insurrection, 1595-1596, starting in Tirnovo, the old Bulgarian capital, and spreading through Sofia, Pirot, Negotin, Ochrida, and other centers.
3. The Insurrection of Kiprovtsi, 1688.
4. That of Nishava 1841, so-called the Nish Insurrection in the reports of the French, Austrian, Russian, and English consuls, according to which "225 Bulgarian villages were destroyed."
5. The Viddin Revolt in 1851.
6. The Thrace and the Maleshevo insurrections in 1876.
7. The Kresna Revolt in 1878.
8. That of Ochrida, 1881.
9. That of Pirin, 1895.
10. The Bitolia in 1903, in which took part more than 30,000 Bulgarian insurgents from Western Macedonia.

III. "The Serb Patriarchy of Ipek had included the Samokov and Kustendil bishoprics," affirms the Serbian Report in order to justify Serbia's claim to the purely Bulgarian town of Kustendil.

In answer to this assertion we will say that for centuries (IX, X, XI, and up to the first half of the XIII), Belgrade, the Serbian capital, was under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Patriarchate (of Preslav, Ochrida, and Tirnovo). Notwithstanding this fact, however, the Bulgarians to-day never think of laying claims to that city.

Kustendil, Samokov, and Northern Macedonia, though for a certain time passed under the jurisdiction of the Serbian church, the Serbian patriarchs, as is evident from various documents, always recognised that they had exercised religious jurisdiction over Bulgarian lands in distinction from the Serbian. In 1371, during the conquest of Kustendil by the Turks, the Turkish chronicles testify that the territory conquered was a Bulgarian land (diar Bolgar). The submission of certain Bulgarian parts to the Serbian church was effected in 1557 through the aid of the Grand Vizier Mehmed, a Serbian by descent, who paved the way for his Christian brother Makari to the post of Serbian Patriarch. As to the Serbian pretensions to Viddin, that city has never been in their possession either spiritually or politically. Its population has always preserved its genuine Bulgarian character. During the XIVth century Viddin was the capital of the Bulgarian Tsar Strashimir. It fell under the Turks in 1396.

The town of *Stroumitsa* which also is desired by the Serbians has never belonged to the Serbian Patriarchy of Ipek.

IV. The Serbian Report asserts that the population known as *Shopes* is "Serbian in origin," and that its racial physiognomy, language, and national customs (slava, zadrouga, &c.) are clear evidences of their Serbian character. All this is nothing but phraseology.

These *Shopes* whom M. Miatovitch, former Serbian Minister in London, describes in his "Memoirs" as Bulgarians of the purest blood, with Sofia as their capital, constitute in reality one of the most representative Bulgarian tribes. Their analytic dialect, their white apparel, their national name of "Bulgarians," their customs and popular beliefs, their intense Bulgarian consciousness, presents a vivid contrast with the Serbs, and, therefore, form with the rest of the Bulgarians an indivisible entity. As to the *slava* (patron feast) and the *zadrouga* (family reunion), alluded to by the Serbian Report as characteristics of the Serbian race, we will say that these customs are in vogue among all Bulgarians, as also in certain Russian districts. In regard to the

patron feast, if that is to be considered as ground for Serbian claim to Bulgarian lands, the Serbs may just as well pretend to the inheritance of ancient Rome, so famous for its feasts. Moreover, the Byzantine chronicles touching these patron feasts celebrated by the southern Slavs during the XIth century are chiefly concerned with the Bulgarians. In 1018, Ivatch, the military chief of the Bulgarian Tsar Samuel, celebrated his patron feast on the day of the Holy Virgin.

All towns, like Viddin, Koula, Kustendil, Petritch, Stroumitsa and their suburbs do not figure as Serb but as purely Bulgarian districts in the ethnographic map of 1913 published by the Serbian Prof. Tsvyitch, at present technical councillor with the Serbian Delegation at Paris.

V. The Serbian Report asserts that the population in the territories now claimed by them had sent to the Berlin Congress of 1878 petitions begging to be allowed to remain under Serbian rule. This is what the Russian General Anoushkin, a member of that Congress, says on the point:

"This morning (July 2nd) I visited Shouvaloff. There I met Ristitch who was engaged in a strong propaganda for securing to Serbia, *Pirot* and Trin, besides *Vranya* which it already possesses. He was so far carried away in his verbosity as to assert that the population of the parts in question desired to become Serb. He pretended to have received numerous declarations to that effect and argued that should a plebiscite be taken all the inhabitants would without hesitation manifest their will in favour of joining Serbia. Being familiar with the actual state of things, I challenged the validity of his statements. I told him that if there were voices favouring Serbia, it was due mainly to the fact that those localities, unfortunately, were occupied by Serbian troops, and that the Serbian administration was committing terrible excesses and was compelling the clergy to mention the name of Prince Milan in their prayers. The metropolitan of Pirot having protested against the Serbian regime was arrested and taken to Nish where he was imprisoned. How may one speak of plebiscite under such conditions? That would be a *shameful comedy* played to the swing of the natchalniks' stick who have become lords of the country, chiefly because we did not occupy it with our troops. Ristitch was intensely irritated but said not a word to refute my arguments."

Just the contrary—that population in 1878 forwarded many petitions to Tsar Alexander II, and to the Russian Govevrnor-General at Sofia, entreating to be delivered from the Serbians and be united with Bulgaria, their mother country.

In reference to the evidence of Count Ignatieff, if he were to have his own way the entire San Stefano Bulgaria would have been given to the Bulgarians, as is made plain from the following statement found in the Russian magazine, *Rouskoe Bogatstvo,* 1900, p. 270: "When after the Treaty of San Stefano a Serbian Minister plenipotentiary reproached Count Ignatieff for his partiality towards the Bulgarians before the conclusion of that treaty, the Count jumping up drew out of his bureau all the papers consulted during the negotiations and unfolded before his interlocutor the Serbian maps and books which confirmed the fact that the territories attributed to the Bulgarians were not Serbian but Bulgarian."

VI. In order to strengthen the Serbian claims and the demand for strategic frontiers, the Report points out to alleged duplicity manifested by the Bulgarians toward the Serbs, both in the past and in the present. To this it must be stated that history affirms just the opposite.

During the IXth century Mountimir, the Serbian ruler, established his authority thanks to the aid which was given him by Prince Boris of Bulgaria. In 917 the Jupanship of Zachlumie gained its hegemony over the Serbian tribes, then engaged in war, always with the support of the Bulgarians. And when in 932 the Bulgarian army tried to put an end to the internecine strifes among the Serbians, it was assailed and beaten by the latter and the heads of the Bulgarian chiefs were sent to Byzantium. In 924 when the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon was besieging Constantinople, the Serbians attacked the Bulgarians from the back. Having concluded peace with the Byzantine Empire, Simeon turned his armies against the Serbian jupans and punished them for their traitorous action. In 930, while civil war was raging in Bulgaria, the Serbs took advantage, and after coming into secret understanding with Byzantium, fell upon the Bulgarians.

Towards the end of the Xth century, Samuel, the Bulgarian Tsar, being engaged in war with the Serbs in Dioclea, vanquished them and made their Prince Ivan-Vladimir prisoner. Later on he placed him again in power and gave him the hand of his daughter Kossara. In 1073 the Bulgarians rose against the Byzantine domination and requested the Serbian Prince Michael to give them as Tsar his son Bodin.

At the battle of Velboujde (1330) the Serbians demanded a two day armistice. The Bulgarians agreed and meanwhile sent a forage party to the villages. Thereupon the Serbians treacherously attacked the camp of the Bulgarian Tsar whom they killed. The war of 1885 is a good illustration of Serbian treachery. While the Bulgarian army

was concentrated towards Adrianople against the Turks, the Serbians struck them from the rear. The Bulgarians soon succeeded in beating them at Slivnitsa and Pirot. It was Austria which saved them from the victorious Bulgarian arms.

In 1913 the Serbians did not wish to execute the treaty concluded in 1912 and came into a secret understanding with the Greeks on May 19th, 1913, that is, more than a month before the second Balkan war. And it was they, and not the Bulgarians, who declared the war with the proclamation of King Peter, June 18-31st, 1913 (Gueshoff: *The Balkan League,* chap. IV). The Bulgarians had stopped hostilities and had proposed to lay the question at issue to arbitrage.

"The injustice done to the Serbians by the Treaty of Berlin," argues the Serbian Report, "should to-day be rectified." How little justified their complaint against the Berlin Congress is may be judged by the fact that the Great Powers through their representatives at the Constantinople Conference in 1876 had given the district of Nish to Bulgaria, while at Berlin in 1878 they ceded it to Serbia. One should read among other authorities the book of Blanqui entitled: *Voyage en Bulgarie,* published in 1841, in order to convince himself of the Bulgarian character of that district. Blanqui who was sent to Nish by Guizot to investigate the insurrection, speaks of that city as the capital of Bulgaria. He calls the bishop of Nish Primate of Bulgaria. He is filled with horror at the ghastly pyramid made up of several thousands Christian skulls, which was raised at the very gates of the city, and remarked that a day perhaps would come when on that spot "Free Bulgaria would erect a temple in their memory."

After the testimony of Count Ignatieff, called forth by the Serbians themselves, that Bulgaria of the San Stefano Treaty did not include Serbians, after that of Blanqui, who declares that the whole of the Nish District is Bulgarian, it is superfluous to multiply the citations which prove that the principle of nationalities has been completely disregarded in Morava in favour of Serbia.

Feeling the untenability of their position, historically and ethnographically, and forgetting that Croats and Slovens up to November last were fighting the Entente on the side of Austro-Hungary, the Serbians reproach Bulgaria for its participation in the world war. The great majority of the Bulgarian people represented by the Opposition was against war. The members of the present Bulgarian Cabinet did all they could in 1915 to prevent their country from going with the Central Powers. Could as much be said of certain members of the Austrian Cabinet of Seidel who to-day compose the Serbian Delega-

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tion at Paris? What then is the difference betwe and the Bulgarians? Both of them driven into the conflict by a monarch alien to their race and terrorised by draconian measures were constrained to fight against the Entente forces. How may the Bulgarians be blamed for not raising a revolution when no symptom of such existed among the Yougoslavs? If the latter after having for forty years tolerated an alliance with Germany, if Serbia after she was for some twenty years in alliance with Austria-Hungary, merit the confidence of the Entente, why should the Bulgarian people, who were only for three years the unwilling partners of the Central Powers, be considered less worthy of such a favour?

We maintain all we have said on this point and on the subject of our territorial claims in our answer to the memoir of Mr. Venizelos. And firmly believing in the spirit of impartiality by which the Peace Congress is guided in its unshaken decision to solve the Balkan problem in conformity with Art. 11 of President Wilson's programme and with the great principles for the triumph of which the Allies have fought, we earnestly request it to disregard the exaggerated pretensions of our neighbours, and to adjudge to Bulgaria the lands which, both the Great Powers and our neighbours themselves, have on so many occasions pronounced as Bulgarian legitimate heritage.

In this manner only may a just and lasting peace be established in the Balkan Peninsula so long the victim of an erring European diplomacy.